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Fragmented small farms in Japan and other high wage rice-based 
economies in monsoon Asia have become an obstacle to sustainable rural 
development. This problem has not yet been resolved under private land 
ownership. This article recommends that based on a mixed economy of private 
ownership of farmland and public ownership of infrastructure land, dispersed 
parcels of farms could be consolidated through exchange of private ownership 
and location into compact land units, which could then be enlarged by individual 
lease or cooperative/enterprise production; land could also be turned to public 
ownership to be contracted to expert fanners and cooperatives/enterprises - both 
would achieve economies of scale of land. In either process, intervention of 
governments, education of public opinion, active participation of farmers, and 
combination with overall rural development are necessary, and application of 
satellite remote sensing and computer technologies is helpful.1
Key Words: Monsoon Asia Rice Economy, Fragmented Small Farms, 
Land Consolidation, Large-Scale Farming, Mixed Economy, Private and Public 
Land Ownership, Dual-Land System.
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In general, the Asian monsoon climate causes rains in May-October and 
dryness in November-April. Only rice suits this climate. It has been the major 
crop for about 40 centuries.1 Up to the end of World War Two (WWII), a 
feudal landlord ownership had been dominant and most peasants owned little or 
no land and were either tenants or wage laborers, although there were also 
owner-peasants. Farm work had to be done by hand, with simple tools. 
Reclamation of new land had reached its limit. In the rainy half year, rice 
cultivation required highly labor-intensive, sophisticated and coordinated work, 
resulting in labor shortage. This demanded more labor and caused high 
population growth, low per capita cultivated land and small size and 
fragmentation of individual (family) farming units.1 2 In contrast, during the dry 
half year, due to insufficient work opportunities, there were serious unemploy­
ment, underemployment or disguised unemployment.3 Poverty was widespread 
and persistent. These rice-based economies were dual economies, predominantly 
agrarian with some industries in big cities.4
With the same natural conditions, such an economic situation was changed 
after WWII first in Japan, then also in Taiwan and South Korea. The Japanese 
model of rural development started in 1946. It combines nine major features or
1 Monsoon Asia contains 19 rice-based economies: China (mainland), Japan, North 
Korea, South Korea and Taiwan Province of China (hereafter Taiwan) in East Asia; 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 
South Asia.
"Farm" (or farming unit) means "agricultural holding", which refers to all land that is 
used wholly or partly for agricultural production and is operated by one person - the holder - 
alone or with the assistance of others, without regard to title, size or location (FAO-PY 1972: 
408).
Fragmentation of an agricultural holding is generally defined as the state of division 
of the holding into many discrete parcels in a village (Fre-Gov 1950: 56. Binns 1950: 5). But 
some just define it as the situation in which a household operates more than one separate 
parcel of land (Blarel; Hazell; Place & Quiggin 1992: 233. Vander Meer 1982: 1).
A parcel is defined as all land in the holding entirely surrounded by land or water of 
other holdings or by land or water not forming part of any holding (FAO 1981: 92). It may 
also be called "noncontiguous piece of land", "plot" or "land unit".
Fragmentation is measured by the number of parcels of land in the holding in one 
village (the case of families holding land in several villages is excluded) (Heston & Kumar 
1983: 199).
3 Those who are willing and able to work but cannot find work are unemployed. Among 
those employed, those who are working less than full time and want more hours of work are 
underemployed. (Oshima 1993: 103). The part of the population engaged in agriculture who 
could be removed without reducing agricultural output, even though the technical methods in 
use remain unchanged, are disguisedly unemployed (Nurkse 1953: 32).
4 Although Japan was developed, its industrialization was based on its import of foods 
from and export of industrial goods to colonies. Its agriculture was relatively stagnant. (Oshi­



























































































stages (drawn mainly from Oshima 1987: 60-65 as well as others indicated 
below).
1. Institutional changes fo r  an individual-cooperative mixed economy:
(1) The land reform during 1946-50 (Hayami & Yamada 1991: 83) 
compulsorily purchased the land of resident landlords over 1 ha and land of 
absentee landlords, sold land to peasants for individual ownership, protected 
tenants from eviction (Rothacher 1989: 16-17), set land rent at a very low level 
and imposed a 3 ha ceiling on land holding (Hayami 1988: 45, 80)5. This gave 
huge incentives for peasants to increase output, but also maintained numerous 
fragmented small farms. On average, the farm size was 0.8-1 ha, number of 
parcels per farm 10-20, and parcel size 0.06 ha, the total one way distance to 
parcels about 4 km (Hyodo 1956: 558) - also see Table below.
(2) The setting-up of national rural cooperatives provided forward and 
backward services and financing to the individual farming units. These were 
mainly service cooperatives. The direct production process of agriculture was 
under the independent control of the individual farming units. (Kojima 1988: 
725)
2. Government policies supporting rice production and rural 
development included rice self-sufficiency, rice price support, farm credit and 
subsidies, technological research and extension services, rice import protection 
during 1961-93, and policies supporting features 1 above and 3-8 below.
Besides institutional changes, technological progress also contributed to 
economic growth, which was embodied in features 3-8. Five steps (3-7 below) 
were taken for reaching full employment:
3. Construction o f rural infrastructure - mainly irrigation, land 
improvement, transportation, communication, electrification, education - 
established the technical basis for further rural development.
4. Higher yields and multiple cropping o f rice and other grains (much 
of this was made possible by high-yielding varieties and fertilizers) raised both 
land and labor productivity and released labor from grain culture.
5. Diversified cropping6 and non-crop agriculture7 raised peasants’ 
income, changed agricultural structures, and promoted rural enterprises for
5 The farm size and fragmentation data in this paper exclude those of Hokkaido which 
is outside the monsoon region and has much larger farm size and fewer fragmented parcels.
6 Diversified cropping implies a shift from a monoculture or a few crops (mainly grains) 
to a larger assortment of crops (roots and tubers, pulses, oil crops, vegetables, fruits, berries, 
treenuts, etc.) (Oshima 1993: 125. FAO-YP 1993: iv).
7 Agriculture - depending on the context - in a broad sense includes cropping (farming), 
animal husbandry, fishery, forestry and hunting (Oshima 1993: 152) (the importance of 
hunting has been declining due to environmental protection); but in a narrow sense may only 




























































































processing, transporting and marketing products of crops, livestock, fishery and 
forestry.
6. Off-farm employment8 offered peasants jobs in both urban and rural 
enterprises, further increased peasants’ income, changed rural structures, and 
promoted urbanization.
7. Peasant migration to cities and towns was mainly by able-bodied 
males, leaving the aged and women in agriculture.
As peasants could get jobs also in the dry half year, full employment was 
achieved and wages rose. Hence a post-full employment step:
8. Agricultural mechanization with small machinery sharply reduced the 
agricultural labor force without affecting output.
The first transition (from agriculture to industry) was hence completed, 
shortage of labor appeared, and the second transition (industry to services) 
started* 9 in Japan around 1960 (FAO-PY 1972: 21). Rice self-sufficiency was 
reached in 1961, per capita product raised, equity in income distribution reached 
and poverty eradicated (Oshima 1987: 115. Oshima 1993: 112,125). These eight 
features continued to function beyond 1960. Except for rice import protection 
in 2 above, they are significant for other economies. At this high stage of rural 
development, all the major obstacles imposed by the monsoon have been 
overcome except for:
9. The fragmented small farms (Kristof 1996: 4). In Japan, as people 
became richer, rice consumption declined, but was still necessary. In the high 
wage economy, the income from rice production turned out to be much lower 
than that from diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture and off-farm 
employment. If rice farmers could not be viable10, they would have to abandon 
rice production so that rice self-sufficiency could not be kept. In order to make 
them viable, the income from rice production should be raised through removing
Off-farm employment of farm families denotes their employment in nonagricultural 
sectors, i.e., industry and services. Industry contains mining, manufacturing, construction, 
public utilities, transportation and communication. Services comprise banking, real estate, 
business, public services which require the highest level of education and retail trade, 
restaurants, domestic and other personal services which only need minimal education. 
(Oshima 1993: 138, 152)
9 In monsoon Asia, the first transition is said to be completed when the share of the 
agricultural labor force in the total labor force (about three fourths) has fallen, while the share 
of the industrial labor force has risen, to roughly one fourth - one third. The second transition 
is said to be concluded when the service sector overtakes the industrial sector in size of labor 
force. But there are elements of arbitrariness in the definitions and some exceptions may be 
possible. (Oshima 1987: 56, 58)
10 Farms that earn income per farm household member equal to, or above, that of non­




























































































fragmentation and enlarging farm size1' so that large machinery could be 
used, labor saved, cost reduced and increasing returns to scale gained, as 
evidence later has shown [Nishimura & Sasaki 1993: 77. JMAFF (c). Hayami 
1988: 98. JMAFF 1994],
Therefore, from 1961 on, as the first major effort toward large-scale 
farming, farmers’ purchase o f land was subsidized by the government. In 1962, 
the land holding ceiling was relaxed. However, not enough land sale occurred. 
On the supply side, part-time farming became dominant. Many able-bodied 
males commuted to off-farm employment, while their wives and old parents 
farmed. Absenteeism also occurred. But the part-time farmers and absentees had 
no incentive to sell land: off-farm income was high, the distance between towns 
and villages short, transportation convenient, they had no need to pay high rent 
for city dwellings, enjoyed less pollution, and preserved a rural house for their 
retirement. Moreover, as industrialization proceeded, land prices soared. Land 
sales in the future would be more profitable than now. On the demand side, 
because land prices went well over income surplus from rice production, it 
became unprofitable for full-time farmers to enlarge farm size through land 
purchase. (Hayami 1988: 80-86). In effect, it was the shortcomings of private 
land ownership that have hampered land sales.
Hence the resort to land lease as the second major effort toward large- 
scale farming. In 1970, rent control was removed, and land could be returned 
to landlords upon termination of contracts of more than 10 years. In 1975 and 
1980, leases for shorter period were also legalized. However, although land lease 
occurred more than sale and formed some large-scale farms1 2, the progress was 
limited. On the supply side, land owners were rich enough from off-farm income 
and did not have much incentive to rent out land. There was a strong 
egalitarianism among village people, who felt uncomfortable if a specific 
villager expanded his farm and became competitive in the market. This resulted 
in entrenched inefficiency and vested interests. (Hayami 1988: 86-88, 126). 
Farm households had a solid preference for permanent residence which has 
continued for generations, and regarded agricultural land as a valuable asset 
handed down from the ancestors which should be passed on as it is to the
11 "Farm size" may refer to the acreage of land, or number of households, of the farm. 
The large farm size advocated in this paper for monsoon Asian rice-based economies denotes 
the large size in land acreage o f farm  whose basic operation unit is one household which may 
receive help from governments, collectives and cooperatives and hire non-family laborers; and 
coilective/cooperative/enterprise farm as agricultural enterprise which may include a number 
of households as share-holders and/or employees.
12 For example, in Saitama Prefecture, some large scale rice-wheat farms were formed 
by owned and leased lands with the acreage from 3 ha to 27 ha and on average 10 ha, but 




























































































offspring. They still feared that once let, land would be lost, as happened in the 
land reform. Thus, people had a tendency to avoid renting out land. On the 
demand side, because the small farm was composed of many fragmented parcels 
located in different parts of the village, it was not always possible for the lessee 
to join them into large land units (since the parcels of other land owners could 
be among them) or change their shape into roads, canals, ponds, etc. (since the 
ownership belonged to the lessor) for using large machinery. (Tabata 1990: 18, 
22). Here, private land ownership constrained both land lease and the efficient 
use of leased land.
Since the 1970s, the third major effort to achieve large-scale farming was 
commissioned agricultural work (also called custom work) - commissioning or 
contracting a part or the whole process of rice cultivation primarily by small 
households holding land up to 0.5 ha to other farmers for using the latter’s 
machinery, labor and management. The fourth major effort was agricultural 
production cooperatives - groups of farm households mainly holding land of 2-5 
ha and over, accomplishing all or a part of agricultural production process by 
jointly using machinery and assigning members to commissioned work. Some 
production cooperatives were joined by farm households of a whole village, 
exercised collective use and management of private farmland and machinery, 
eliminated boundaries among parcels, thus enlarged farming scale (NIRA 1995: 
173-174, 176-177). The fifth major effort was enterprise farming - enterprises 
other than farm households organized joint management, joint venture, 
production corporation and limited companies in farming including receiving 
commissioned work. These three forms all had advantages in tilling otherwise 
idle land, achieving economies of scale in using machinery, labor and 
management, and reducing cost of machinery. (Tabata 1990: 20-22). But except 
for the case of collective use of private land, they were less successful in 
achieving economies of scale of land. Without the agreement of all land owners 
concerned, they were unable to change land shape and form large land units. 
Fragmentation was still a barrier. Even in the case of collective use of private 
land, cooperative members could agree to remove boundaries among parcels, but 
disagree to turn their parcels into roads, canals, ponds, etc. Moreover, they held 
the right to quit the cooperative. In so doing, the joined land would be re-split.
The following Table shows that not much success in economies of scale 
of land has been achieved. Fragmentation was preserved even in those farms 
enlarged to over 5 ha. Much land still remained with part-time farmers and 
absentees in inefficient use. In 1994, of all farm households, full-time 
households accounted for only 16.1 %, while part-time 1 (mainly farming) took 
13.9 %, and part-time 2 (mainly on other jobs) 70 % (JSY 1996: 224).
As a result, the number of viable farms diminished, and farmers and 




























































































to yield, fearing loss of votes. [JMAFF (a). JMAFF (b). Hayami 1988: 27, 49, 
51, 81. JSY 1996: 223. JMAFF 1995: 177], In 1960, a ”cost-of-production and 
income-compensation scheme" was designed. The government as the 
monopsonist buyer (through the national cooperatives) bought rice at a 
predetermined price and sold it at a lower price, thus subsidizing rice farmers. 
The 1961 Agricultural Basic Law prohibited rice imports. Rice prices increased 
to 10 times the world level in the 1980s. Stimulated by the price distortion, rice 
was overproduced until 1992. (Schaede; Asada & Tokunaga 1994: 388. Schaede; 
Lowe & Tokunaga 1996: 422)
Japanese Farm Size (ha) 1950-94 and Fragmentation 1988
Year Under
0.5




1950 41.0 32.0 21.7 3.4 1.2 0.8 100 % 1.0
1960 38.3 31.7 23.6 3.8 1.5 1.0 100 % 1.0
1970 38.0 30.2 24.1 4.8 1.7 1.3 100 % 1.1
1980 41.6 28.1 21.2 5.3 2.2 1.5 100 % 1.2
1985 42.7 27.1 20.4 5.5 2.5 1.7 100 % 1.2
1990 41.7 28.1 20.9 9.3 100 % 1.1
1994 21.7 37.2 27.9 13.3 100 % 1.4
Parcels per farm over 5 ha
1988 1-4 5-8 9 and more
100 % 28.4 39.1 32.5
Sources: For 1950-85: Kayo 1977; JMAFF (a); JMAFF (d); Hayami 1988: 
27. For 1990 and 1994: JSY 1992: 161; JSY 1996: 223, 229. For 1988: 
JMAFF 1988: 250.
Consequently, in the 1980s, the budget deficit on rice rose to more than 
US$ 7,000 million. Internationally, protests flowed, especially from the US. The 
GATT Uruguay Round of 1993 stipulated a "phase-in” of rice imports of 10 % 
of the total market until 2005. When Japan experienced a disastrous harvest in 
1993, rice had to be imported for the first time after 1960, in 1994, from 
Australia, China, Thailand and the US. (Schaede; Lowe & Tokunaga 1996: 422- 
423. ESJ 1960-61: 70). Rice self-sufficiency was thus over. In 1996, two thirds 




























































































expected. (Kristof 1996: 4). However, with fragmented small farms, it is difficult 
for rice farmers to survive and for the government to restore rice self- 
sufficiency. Subsidies have to continue. A grant of 6,000 billion yen was 
included in the 1995/96 budget for farmers to adjust to the new regime 
(Schaede; Lowe & Tokunaga 1996: 423). Thus, the critical issue is how to 
consolidate and enlarge the fragmented small farms.
The fragmented small farms were efficient in a low wage economy since 
they were conducive to development and diffusion of land-saving and scale- 
neutral technology, dispersion of natural risks, and provision of employment to 
peasants without off-farm job opportunities. But in a high wage economy, they 
hamper the achievement of economies of scale of land, and waste resources of 
land, labor, capital, management, and technology. This problem is common to 
all rapidly industrializing economies with limited land resources and reduced 
working population in agriculture (although their degrees of fragmentation may 
vary). Of other rice-based economies under private land ownership in monsoon 
Asia, Taiwan and South Korea replicated the Japanese model. (Hayami & 
Yamada 1991: 7). Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines; Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Bhutan and Nepal are generally at lower stages of 
the model. Once their industrialization has led them into the high wage 
economy, this fragmented small farm structure would also prove to be 
inefficient.
Therefore, the fragmented small farms have become the remaining or last 
obstacle to sustainable agricultural and rural development in monsoon Asia.13 
Although substantial analysis of this problem has been made by many leading 
economists in this field for many years, fundamental solutions have not yet been 
found (e.g., Bray 1986. Oshima 1987. Hayami 1988. Rothacher 1989. Hayami 
& Yamada 1991. Oshima 1993. Francks 1995. NIRA 1995) (Taiwan and India 
have consolidated farmland to a certain extent, but fragmentation still exists and 
farms are still small in general).
This paper presents two proposals to consolidate and enlarge the 
fragmented small farms in Japan. The recommendations are drawn mainly in 
terms of the historical experience of Japan, but also those of other countries and 
regions (lengthy details, however, are not dealt with).
Proposal 1. Consolidation and expansion of the fragmented small farms 
based on a mixed economy of private ownership of farmland and public
13 In 1991, FAO/Netherlands Conference on Agriculture and the Environment defined 
the essential and interdependent goals of sustainable agricultural and rural development as 
"Food security, to be obtained by ensuring an appropriate and sustainable balance between 
self-sufficiency and self-reliance; employment and income generation in rural areas, 
particularly to eradicate poverty; and natural resource conservation and environmental 




























































































ownership of infrastructure land.
The first step, consolidation of the fragmented farms.
Definition o f land consolidation under private land ownership. Land 
consolidation is an exchange of the private ownership and location of spatially 
dispersed parcels of farms to form new holdings containing just one (or as few 
as possible) parcel(s), with the same (or similar) wealth in land as that before 
the exchange. No land owner would be a loser after the consolidation. 
(Oldenburg 1990: 183). It is, however, not a measure for social justice. It neither 
changes the status of the large and small land owners, nor gives farmland to the 
landless. (Trivedi & Trivedi 1973: 180). Therefore, it could be implemented 
with no or incomplete land reform [e.g., in India since 1900 (Zaheer 1975: 92- 
95, 118)14], or together with the land reform [e.g., in Denmark during 1770s- 
1835 and Ireland during 1870-1940s, which distributed land of landlords to 
peasants with equity in consolidated forms (Skovgaard 1950: 43, 45. Ire-Gov 
1950: 64-76)], or after the land reform [e.g., in Switzerland during 1840-1940s 
and Taiwan since 1959, which preserved equity in land ownership (Swi-Gov 
1950: 82, 85. Huang, Chieh 1967: Foreword. Myers 1996: 260)].
General procedure of land consolidation. There has been little difference 
between developing and developed countries as far as collective action for 
consolidation is concerned (Sharma 1986: 716). Programs of land consolidation 
differ in various respects: from voluntary to compulsory, from dealing only with 
farmland to being linked to overall rural development, from farmers alone 
bearing the cost to sharing it with the authorities (Oldenburg 1990: 183), and 
from using primitive methods to advanced satellite remote sensing and computer 
technologies. Here is the general procedure.
Administrative preparations. Government guidance committees at national 
and local (province, prefecture, county, municipality, district) should be set up; 
education of public opinion about the disadvantages of fragmentation and 
advantages of land consolidation made; laws, statutes and regulations concerning 
the major aspects of the land consolidation established; and special tribunals at 
primary and appellate courts formed. Especially, it should be decided whether 
land consolidation should be started upon the consent of landowners by 100 % 
(voluntary), or 0 % (compulsory), or between these two extremes (partly 
voluntary or partly compulsory).
Once a village has decided to carry out land consolidation, it should set
14 Even in the 1980s, in some areas of India, poor farmers with small parcels of low- 
value land might only be able to trade them in for an even smaller but better land unit which 
merely allowed them to grow some vegetables (Oldenburg 1990: 189). The lack of a complete 
land reform for equity in land ownership may be one reason why rural poverty is still 




























































































up an executive committee consisting of representatives of officials, large and 
small land owners and tenants, and under which a technicians group composed 
of experts on survey, appraisal, land records, computer, rural infrastructure and 
development as well as some officials. An expected time limit for completing 
the consolidation should be announced.15 Landholders (owners and tenants) 
would thereafter be prohibited from taking any action which might lower the 
value of their land property without the permission of the village executive 
committee. Infringers of this rule are liable to a fine. (Vanderpol 1956: 552). 
New construction in the fields and transfer of lands would not be allowed (Elder 
1962: 23).
Technical preparations. The technicians group should correct the current 
farmland cadastral records, and produce a provisional consolidation scheme with 
maps of assessing the value of the current land holdings, setting aside land for 
the communal use, and assigning new holdings to each household (Bonner 1987: 
21). It should then send the scheme with the maps to the village executive 
committee which in turn should inform all households of this for discussion. In 
case of disagreement, households could appeal for re-arrangement to the village 
executive committee, the guidance committees of the local governments, the 
primary court and appellate court whose judgement should be final. (Trivedi & 
Trivedi 1973: 183. Oldenburg 1990: 185)
Implementation. Once the appeals have been handled, the consolidation 
scheme could be fixed. After the main (autumn) harvest, it could be 
implemented. The new land cadastral records should then be established by 
notary public. The consolidation is thus completed. (Bonner 1987: 22. Vanderpol 
1956: 553)
Some major issues in the above general procedure are discussed below.
Education of public opinion. The "public" includes both peasants and 
policy-makers. In Japan, land consolidation was already sporadically carried out 
in the ancient times. In 1901, the law on cultivated land consolidation was 
established to enable owners of agricultural land to organize cooperatives for the 
consolidation of their lands. But the feudal landlords hampered the progress. The 
postwar government decided to postpone land consolidation until the land reform 
had been completed. Thus, in June 1949, the Land Improvement Law was 
introduced but not actually realized. There were both technological and 
economic causes such as incomplete rural infrastructure, especially irrigation, the 
need to spread risks of natural disasters over dispersed parcels, rice monoculture 
by overpopulated farming communities, etc. There also were psychological
15 For example, it took two-three years in France and three-four years in the Netherlands 
in the 1940s-50s, and six-nine months in some areas of India in the 1980s (Roche 1956: 543. 




























































































reasons not least that peasants did not want to leave parcels inherited from their 
ancestors. (Hyodo 1956: 558-559). Although the technological and economic 
problems had generally been overcome by the end of the 1950s, land 
consolidation has not been promoted since. This reflects not only the prevalence 
of the psychological factors, but also the lack of firm commitment of the 
government which has failed to attach enough importance to it. For example, in 
"The Basic Direction of New Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas" 
of Nov. 1992, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(JMAFF) only devoted a few words, in a total of 34 pages, to this issue (even 
without using the term "land consolidation"): "To foster farm management 
bodies that will operate on large-scale, aggregated farmland, methods to promote 
land improvement projects will be implemented that allow land to be 
exchanged" (JMAFF 1992: 15). Thereafter, however, little land consolidation has 
taken place. Thus, it is necessary for the government to make it a major effort. 
Education of peasants on the disadvantages of fragmentation and advantages of 
land consolidation should also be strengthened so as to mobilize them to actively 
participate.
Consent of peasants. The process of exchange of private parcels for 
consolidation would not be easy. There are indefinite individual obstacles to 
land consolidation. The resulting farms differ considerably in size, type, and 
topography. Some farmers get better bargains than others - and probably a still 
larger number will fear that others may do so. Some households may receive 
poorer land than they had before. It may not be possible to accommodate all the 
farmers. This would be compounded by the inertia of peasant tradition. For 
example, one family could claim that its parcels are heritage of its ancestors and 
could not be given away. Another may feel unfamiliar with the new parcels. 
There also will be financial concerns. For instance, some farmers may worry 
that permanent crops, buildings, etc., in the old parcels would not be sufficiently 
compensated. (Binns 1950: 22-23). Such realities imply that - to fulfil its 
objectives - consolidation may be voluntary, compulsory or partly voluntary.
- Voluntary consolidation is one when 100 % of landowners of the village 
(or area concerned) agree to carry it out. It could be spontaneous efforts of 
farmers in the form of cooperatives or personal exchanges, and should be 
assisted and encouraged by governments. However, for the above reasons, such 
operations are slow and unsatisfactory. Anything like complete success is 
unlikely to result from purely private enterprise. (Binns 1950: 24-25. Zaheer 
1975: 92-93. Clout 1984: 104)
For example, consolidation was practiced in the village fields of Oster 
Hjermitslev, Denmark, in 1820 by the freehold farmers (owner-peasants) 
themselves. Having been unable to agree on a rational consolidation scheme, the 




























































































1917, nearly 100 years after, though some amalgamation of the parcels of land 
had taken place, the situation remained unchanged. Experience in Denmark has 
been that where the consolidation process has been under the peasants alone, it 
has been badly carried out. (Skovgaard 1950: 45-46, 50-51). Slow progress 
under voluntary consolidation was also evident in France (1697-1888), 
Switzerland (1884-1911), India (1900-1951), and the Netherlands (before 1920) 
(Roche 1956: 539. Swi-Gov 1950: 83. Zaheer 1975: 92-93. Clout 1984: 104. 
Vanderpol 1956: 549). Therefore, government intervention was called for.
- Compulsory consolidation, as another extreme, is one imposed by the 
authorities even if 0 % of landowners of the village (or area concerned) wishes 
to start it. The authorities normally listen to landowners - but not through mass 
voting - before making decision, and landowners could also appeal but have to 
accept the decision of the higher authorities. This approach may result in 
uncooperation, resentment and resistance of peasants. It might succeed in 
relatively less democratic times or areas relatively easier for consolidation [e.g., 
there were positive cases in Denmark during 1770s-1835 and France during 
1935-80s (Skovgaard 1950: 43-45. Fre-Gov 1950: 59-60. Roche 1956: 539-543. 
Clout 1984: 105-110)], but not succeed much, or even fail, in an increasingly 
democratic era or regions comparably more difficult for consolidation. For 
example, in the 1950s, in the village of Manovan, Uttar Pradesh of India, 
opposition to compulsory consolidation took a political turn when the Jan Sangh 
Party led a campaign to obstruct consolidation and evicted farmers who took the 
newly assigned parcels. Police had to arrest seven local leaders before 
consolidation could proceed. (Elder 1962: 27). In France, such schemes have 
been criticized as being over costly, bureaucratic and paying too much attention 
to the interests of land owners, especially in areas where tenancy was important. 
Fragmentation was still a severe problem in the 1980s, particularly in vine and 
fruit growing regions. (Harrison 1982: 41-42). In 1996, small farmers in 
Slovenia resisted the government’s decision to proceed with compulsory 
consolidation (Riddell 1996). Therefore, democracy and sufficient participation 
by peasants in deciding whether to carry out consolidation are important.
- Partly voluntary consolidation is one started with the consent of some 
landowners of the village (or area concerned) and approval of the authorities, 
while others, although disagreeing, have to follow. Accord by substantial 
majority (two thirds of land owners representing two thirds of land) is similar 
to a voluntary scheme and therefore is difficult to obtain. Consent by simple 
minority (one third of land owners representing one third of land, or even less) 
is close to compulsory action and thus could not always achieve the cooperation 
of other farmers in a democratic era. Agreement by simple majority (51 %) or 
half would be more effective. Therefore, on one hand, the Netherlands 




























































































further to 51 % in 1938 (Vanderpol 1956: 549); on the other, Sweden changed 
from requiring the agreement of only one land owner in a village in 1757 to that 
of majority in 1926 (Ytterborn 1956: 560). Taiwan and Portugal adopted 51 % 
in 1936 and 1962 [Huang, Chieh 1967: (Appendix) 1, 37-38. Monke; Avillez & 
Ferro 1992: 69], while Greece and Japan stipulated 50 % in 1948 and 1949 
respectively (Keeler & Skuras 1990: 74. Hyodo 1956: 559) [in India, rules vary 
among states from compulsory, simple minority, to substandal majority 
(Agarwal 1971: Appendix II)]. In general, once 51 % of landowners representing 
51 % of land in the area concerned have agreed, land consolidation could be 
started.
Here, governmental intervention toward consolidation has aimed at 
encouraging voluntary action and supporting it by financial and other 
inducements, and technical assistance. Such activities need to educate public 
opinion, with very careful and intensive preparation. Nevertheless, legal power 
for compulsory action should be reserved in special cases. (Binns 1950: 25). For 
example, the Netherlands empowered the Ministry of Agriculture in 1938 to 
impose consolidation schemes when they were urgently demanded by the public 
interest even if the necessary votes had not been obtained; and Greece 
prescribed in 1948 that consolidation could be compulsory if it was needed to 
successfully complete drainage and irrigation projects - both of them have 
facilitated land consolidation (Vanderpol 1956: 550, 552. Keeler & Skuras 1990: 
74-75).
However, the above-mentioned "The Basic Direction of New Policies for 
Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas" of Nov. 1992 by JMAFF declared that "In 
the implementation of improvement projects for farmland, the consensus of the 
farmers concerned must be obtained." (JMAFF 1992: 15). This has doubled the 
50 % requirement by the Japanese law of 1949 to 100 % which is infeasible. 
Agreement by 51 % of land owners plus government compulsory action in 
special cases would be more effective.
Assessment of the value o f current farmland holdings. The most critical 
phase of the entire process is the evaluation of the farmlands. Only an impartial 
and accurate valuation can assure a fair and equitable redistribution. Three major 
methods for valuing land could be considered. These are valuation by (1) market 
price; (2) rental value; and (3) land productivity. The main disadvantage of the 
first method is that the market price of some parcels (e.g., those near the village 
site) may be very high as reflecting industrial or housing demand for land rather 
than agricultural profits. The major disadvantage of the second is that rental 
system varies from fixed rent to proportionate rent in cash or kind, which 
renders the determination of exact rental value difficult. Therefore, the third 
method is more suitable. Under this system, the value of a parcel of land is 




























































































factors should be considered, including the acreage, fertility, access to water, 
flatness and distance to the village site, etc. After touring the village lands, the 
technicians group select some parcels which are, by common agreement, the best 
in the village in terms of one or some of these factors, thus becoming the 
standard of others. (Bonner 1987: 22. Roche 1956: 541). Below is an illustration 
[The principle in the following method has been used in practice (e.g., in India - 
Oldenburg 1990: 186). But the mathematical generalization is made by the 
author as unfound in the literature reviewed. It could be adapted to local 
conditions and expanded to more complicated models using econometric tools 
and computer techniques. The numbers are hypothetical. The sizes of farms in 
figures are not proportionate to the grades].
Suppose: A village has m (say, five) household farms - Fm: m = 1, 2, ..., 
5;
Each farm has up to n (say, 10) parcels located in different places - P„: 
n = 1, 2, ... , 10; also suppose F, has 6 parcels, F, 7 parcels, .... F5 10 parcels; 
(see Figure 2)
Each parcel can be assessed on i factors (say, five: acreage, fertility, 
access to water, flatness, distance to village site) - Q;: i = 1, 2, .... 5; the best 
parcel in one factor could be assessed as 1 (e.g., in Figure 1, P, is valued as 1 
in Q2 - fertility, and P4 is given 1 in Qs - distance to village site), parcels 
inferior to it could be given numbers smaller than 1.
Each factor could be given different weight - W;: = (0, 1), j = 1, 2, ..., 5; 
Total W = 1 (acreage and fertility may receive higher weights, and in general 
a smaller area of good land could be exchanged with a larger area of poor land; 
in Figure 1, these five factors are given weights of 0.35, 0.35, 0.15, 0.05, 0.1 
respectively) (See formulas and illustration in Figure 1).
Following the assessment, grade could be given to each farm, say, F, = 
2.48, F2 = 3.26, F3 = 4.37, F4 = 5.93, F5 = 6.12.
The fixed capital assets (permanent crops, orchards, vineyards, buildings, 
wells, etc.) on the parcels are not natural but artificial factors. Those which have 
to be destroyed should be reimbursed or rebuilt in the new place by the village; 
those which will be reserved but transferred to another owner should be paid by 
that owner (offsetting between owners may be arranged), or be valued as extra 
grade to the parcels.
Promotion of rural development. Among the newly established larger land 
units, major infrastructure items (main roads among farms and linked to other 
villages, water conservancy, irrigation and drainage network linking 
lakes-rivers-canals-ditches-drains, electricity facilities, etc.) should be built, so 
that each land unit could have easy access to roads, large machinery, irrigation 
and other facilities. A scientific design for the facilities of processing and storing 




























































































telecommunications office, village administrative offices, housing, land for 
industrial use, land reserved for future construction, etc., in the village site 
should be made. Environmental protection (forest, nature reserves, tourist resorts, 
etc.) should be taken into consideration.
Thus, a number of villages in a district could coordinate their 
consolidation plans or even create a general one. Migration of some peasants 
from the congested to less crowded rural districts could be arranged, so that both 
the remaining and outgoing peasants could acquire larger land units. Apparently, 
government coordination is necessary.
Each farm should contribute a small percentage (e.g., 3 % - 5 %) of 
farmland for the communal use. The removal of numerous boundaries would 
make this possible without (significant) reduction of farm size. (Zaheer 1975: 
113). Nominal compensation could be paid to the contributors by the village 
(Trivedi & Trivedi 1973: 183-184). Exchanges between farmland and non­






















































































































































































F ig u re  2  B e fo r e  C o n so lid a tio n  - F ra gm e n te d  F arm s
F ,P . F 4P, F3P, F 2P, F 5P, F ,P 2 F 2P 2 F sP2
f 2p 3 F 5P 3 F : P4 f 4p 2 F 3P 2 f 4p 3 f 5p 4 F ,P 3
F3P3 f ,p 4 F 4P4 F sP 5 F 4P s F 5P6 F 2P 5 f 3p 4
f 4p 6 f 3p 5 F 5P 7 F ,P 5 F 2P6 F 3P6 F 4P 7 F 5P 8
f 5p 9 F 4P 8 F3P7 f 2p 7 f 3p 8 F 5P ,o F ,P 6 F 4P9
F ig u re  3 A fte r  C o n so lid a tio n  - E a ch  F arm  H as T w o  P a rcels
F ,P , f 3p , f 5p , f 2p 2 F4P2
f 2p , f 4p , F ,P 2 f 3p 2 f 5p 2
F ig u re  4  A fte r  C o n so lid a tio n  - E a ch  F arm  H as O ne  P a rcel
F , f 2 f 3 f 4 f 5
The land beneath the major infrastructure items should be publicly owned 
by governments (central, local) or village - hence a mixed economy of private 
ownership of farmland and public ownership of infrastructure land. The main 
reasons are that private land owners may inhibit others from getting access to 
these items (Oldenburg 1990: 188) and also have the right to withdraw their 
land if they wish, which would exert harmful externalities on other peasants and 
the whole community. The infrastructure items themselves could belong to the 




























































































investment shares. [There have been good experiences in combining land 
consolidation with the overall rural development in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, the Netherlands, etc. (Clout 1984: 108-116. Zaheer 1975: 112- 
113. Keeler & Skuras 1990: 75)]
Assignment o f new farmland to each household. The land assigned to each 
farm should be given the most practical shape possible (in general rectangular - 
the length of the parcel should not be more than three or four times its breadth, 
and square for larger parcels) (Skovgaard 1950: 44. Roche 1956: 541). After the 
reorganization, each household would privately own one or a few (preferably no 
more than three) compact farmland unit(s) (see Figures 3 and 4). The total farm 
size is more or less the same as before, but the size of land unit (parcel) is 
larger. For example, a farm previously composed of 10 dispersed parcels (on 
average 0.1 ha each) can now hold one compact parcel of 1 ha.
Some discreteness of parcels may be rational due to differences in 
geography, ecology, etc. For example, a farmer may need both summer and 
winter pasture in certain hill areas, or land suitable for seed nurseries and land 
for growing of rice, or varieties of soil and situation in certain types of mixed 
farming to avoid risk of being dependent on one product. There is also local 
custom of working both an upland parcel and a parcel on river banks and islands 
where work is done at entirely different seasons. (Binns 1950: 31. Fleston & 
Kumar 1983: 213). Many farms in mountain regions consist of three separate 
estates - in the plains, in the middle levels and on the high levels. The solution 
may be to lighten the task and the expense of the peasants by regrouping to the 
greatest possible extent the lands which they possess at the various levels, and 
by reducing to a minimum the capital invested in construction. (Swi-Gov 1950: 
90). In a village with very distinct qualities of land, exchanging a smaller area 
of good land with a larger area of poor land to form just one compact land unit 
for each farm might be difficult. Under such circumstances, different qualities 
could be classified into a few (e.g., three) classes, and a farmer could retain 
consolidated parcels of each quality, whose original fragments were in each 
class. (Heston & Kumar 1983: 209-210, 213). In general, most farms should 
contain only one parcel, with a few farms holding two or three (Oldenburg 
1990: 186. Trivedi & Trivedi 1973: 186. Skovgaard 1950: 43-44).
Application of modern technologies. A cadastre, which registers not only 
the boundaries but also the quality and value of real estate, is basic to land 
redistribution. Previously, with hundreds of tiny parcels to delineate, it could 
take years, often decades, for surveyors to draw and redraw maps to come up 
with an equitable form of consolidation. Mistakes occurred16, disputes
16 In the land consolidation of some areas of India, irrigation experts had to rely on 




























































































increased, farmers felt imposed on and were reluctant to cooperate. (Nelson 
1993: 24)
Now, this work can be much simplified. The government could organize 
satellite remote sensing for national land cover mapping as a component within 
a Geographic Information System (GIS), providing land data to each village 
(Haack & English 1996: 845). An ordinary personal computer equipped with the 
right program can create a cadastre from aerial photographs and digitalized field 
notes gathered with high speed by an Electronic Distance Measuring system 
(EDM). Values of parcels resulting from assessment can also be put in. Using 
the computer, a surveyor can produce a cadastre in minutes and redraw it just 
as quickly in response to any number of "what if ' scenarios. It can be done on 
the spot with the participation of the local farming community. People whose 
land boundaries are in question can consider the alternatives and explain exactly 
what they want and do not want at each step. Each household could see the new 
map including its own future farm in the computer screen and make appeals if 
necessary before the consolidation scheme is finalized. Once the final version 
is ready, the information is fed into a larger, more powerful micro-computer 
capable of drawing the fine lines needed for boundaries and producing a map 
on durable, high-quality paper. (Nelson 1993: 24). In this way, survey, valuation, 
calculation, design, allocation, expenditure, etc., could be much facilitated, 
mistakes reduced, disputes decreased, unfair distribution due to corruption of 
officials supervised and time shortened.
Control of corruption. Corruption could be a major problem in the 
consolidation. It is reported that in some areas of India, large land owners paid 
bribes to the consolidation officials and got land of better quality, near the 
village and with fewer parcels, while the small owners could not afford to bribe, 
thus received the opposite and became poorer (Elder 1962: 36). Factions in the 
villages are commonplace and can stimulate corruption. Except for using 
computer as mentioned above, thorough and intensive inspection, investigation 
of appeals on the spot before the whole village assembly and removal of the 
corrupt officials are necessary for combating this problem. (Trivedi & Trivedi 
1973: 185)
Appeals should thus be handled, at maximumly three levels in 
administrative system (village executive committee, guidance committees of two 
levels of the local governments above the village), plus two levels in judicial 
system (primary and appellate courts). A time limit for processing is necessary, 
because once consolidation has been promulgated, farmers would not improve 
the original land but wait for the new one (Trivedi & Trivedi 1973: 185). 
Administrative processing of appeals should take no more than three months.




























































































Courts would take a much longer time and cost much more money. Thus either 
special tribunals should be set up to speed the processing, or peasants be 
persuaded not to sue for small bargains (Oldenburg 1990: 185-186) and 
administrative processing be strengthened accordingly.
Expenses are incurred in the above process. For private landholders, some 
permanent crops, buildings and other infrastructure in the old parcels would 
have to be removed and compensated, new buildings and other infrastructure in 
the new farms be built and subsidized. Some peasants might be asked to migrate 
to other areas and be subsidized as well. Public infrastructure implies public 
finance. Fees for organizational purposes occurred for setting up ad hoc 
committees, inviting external experts, etc. These expenses should be borne by 
the central and local governments, village and landholders in the form of 
government grants and loans, bank credits, and personal payments. The village 
and landholders should be involved in decision making and allocation 
concerning the funds.
The second step, expansion o f the consolidated farms for efficient use by 
full-time farmers.
Land consolidation only turns farms from fragmented to compact. It 
neither enlarges farm size nor ensures efficient use of the consolidated land. For 
example, land consolidation in Taiwan was strengthened in 1975 as "the second 
land reform". By 1982, 300,000 ha, or two thirds of 446,000 ha farmland 
planned for consolidation had been reorganized into large, rectangular fields 
more suitable for mechanized farming. By 1989, however, 88.6 % of farming 
households were still part-time farms, which earned 62.8 % of their income from 
off-farm activities. (Myers 1996: 260). In 1994, 4.4 ha were the rice farming 
area that enabled a full-time farm family to earn an income from its farming to 
balance off its consumptive expenditure. But those who held this or larger land 
scale only accounted for 7 % of all the farm families. (Cheng, Shy-Hwa 1994: 
94-95). Therefore, after consolidation, special measures should be taken to make 
farms enlarged and used efficiently by full-time farmers. There could be two 
ways to achieve this end.
(1) Individual lease. Part-time farmers and absentees could lease their 
compact land units to full-time farmers so that the latter could operate larger 
land and use large machinery. Some shortcomings may remain. First, if the land 
units of lessor and lessee are noncontiguous but across some land units of other 
owners, it would be difficult to join them by re-exchange of private ownership 
and location of land units with their neighbors, due to the high transaction costs 
involved. Second, once the lease contract is over, the lessor may withdraw the 
land. Hence, keeping/raising economies of scale of land would be hampered. 
Third, young people may not want to succeed their old parents in farming.




























































































cooperative/enterprise, public land used for infrastructure and private farmland 
could become land shares (private land owners may choose not to till the land); 
members (even those outsiders who do not own any land in the 
cooperative/enterprise) could invest capital shares, while revenue could be 
distributed among land shares, capital shares and labor contribution. Members 
could then contribute to further investment in the cooperative/enterprise (e.g., 
buying more machines) as their new capital shares. During the consolidation of 
private farmland, the land units of those who wish to join the 
cooperative/enterprise could be put together, so that the land units of all land 
owners of the cooperative/enterprise could be joined to reach a level of 
economies of scale much larger than that under individual lease. Increasing 
capital shares could make the position of the cooperative/enterprise in equipment 
(especially large machinery), etc., much stronger than that of individual lease. 
Some well-trained managers could be hired to supervise the operation of full­
time farmers/employees. Wage labor could be employed so as to overcome the 
problem of no successor as faced in individual farming. One remaining 
shortcoming may be that some private land owners may quit the 
cooperative/enterprise someday if they wish. As a result, the large joined land 
may be split again.
"The Basic Direction of New Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural 
Areas" of Nov. 1992 by JMAFF proclaimed that "To foster farm management 
bodies that will operate on large-scale, aggregated farmland, methods to promote 
land improvement projects will be implemented that ... establish land-use rights 
in an integrated manner with the full agreement of both owners and users of the 
land." (JMAFF 1992: 15). Actually, however, just as it is difficult to get full 
agreement of land owners to carry out land consolidation, it is hard to obtain a 
consensus of both land owners and users for farm enlargement. Therefore, for 
promoting farm expansion, it is also necessary to educate the public opinion to 
reduce/remove the above-mentioned peasants’ egalitarianism against fellow 
villagers to expand farms and their aversion to lease land. On those absentee 
landowners and part-time farmers who are unwilling to lease land or join 
cooperative/enterprise, tax could be imposed (Schiller 1956: 563).
Proposal 2. Establishment of a dual-land system based on public land 
ownership.
Rural land could be purchased for public ownership at appropriate prices 
(lower than the levels representing the industrial demand for land), while all the 
other means of production could be privately, publicly and jointly owned. Then 
a dual-land system under the management of villages and regulation of central 
and local governments could be set up. (1) Land for living could be distributed 
equally to rural residents for their use in agricultural production for self­




























































































proportionate farmland should be withdrawn from his (her) household. 
Considering the strong attachment to ancient land by Japanese peasants, the 
already assigned housing land upon which private houses have been built might 
possibly be reserved for retirement use and even inherited. But new housing 
land would reasonably not be assigned to the emigrant. (2) Land for production 
should be contracted in long term to expert farmers who bid for higher output 
of rice and other products so that large land units could be formed and large 
machinery used. Contract could be transferred and renewed according to market 
principles of competition. Within the contract period, if not due to natural 
disaster, output target is not reached, land quality destroyed, production 
abandoned, etc., the contract could be stopped and sanction made. If land 
improvement has been made, awards could be given. If some production 
becomes surplus, fields could be used for other (even non-agricultural) 
productive purposes. Production cooperatives/enterprises (as presented above but 
without private land shares) could also be set up, in which expert farmers could 
work together. Wage labor could be hired as well.
The result is a mixed economy of public land ownership, private/public 
ownership of other means of production, individual/cooperative/collective 
management and capitalist wage labor employment. The above-mentioned 
shortcomings in individual lease and production cooperative/enterprise with 
private land shares could be avoided. Needless to say, intervention of 
governments, education of public opinion, active participation of peasants, and 
combination with overall rural development are necessary. Details (the public 
ownership be at state, local government or village level; land-purchase procedure 
and prices; land-contract length and fee, etc.) should be determined through 
gradual experiments, public discussions, and expert consultations.
In the current global wave of privatization, this proposal might not be 
adopted immediately. But it may deserve consideration and experiments. In 
China, the economic reform against the centrally planned economy starting in 
1978 created village-owned but household-managed fragmented small farms 
which brought huge incentives to peasants for production. However, as more and 
more rural regions successively moved into the high wage economy, this 
fanning stmcture also hampered sustainable rural development. Thus, since the 
1980s, the dual-land system has been practiced. It achieved large-scale farming 
and succeeded in overcoming this obstacle. In Japan, the collective use and 
management of private land by village production cooperative were a 
spontaneous effort by village officials and peasants to resolve the same obstacle. 
It could remove boundaries among parcels and reach large-scale farming, but 
households could refuse to change their parcels into roads, canals, ponds, etc., 
and could quit the cooperative, thus refragmentizing the joined land, as already 




























































































development so as to overcome such shortcomings.
To what extent should a farm be enlarged? This is a practical question to 
which the answer depends on time and place. For example, in 1994, in Saitama 
Prefecture of Japan, the critical size for a viable rice farm has been established 
at 15 ha or more (Kurita 1994: 511), while in Taiwan a survival area for a full­
time rice farm was 4.4 ha as mentioned above. As time passes, the economic 
structures (urban-rural, industry-agriculture, import-export, etc.), technologies, 
managing and tilling skills as well as the ratio of cost/profit in rice and other 
agricultural production change. Thus, farm size could be adjusted accordingly 
by joining compact farms for expansion or separating them for contraction.
These two proposals for Japan might also be useful for other rice-based 
economies in monsoon Asia under the private land ownership once the 
fragmented small farms have become an obstacle to sustainable rural 
development.
Conclusion. In order to overcome the fragmented small farms obstacle in 
Japan and other rice-based economies of monsoon Asia, this article proposes 
that based on a mixed economy of private ownership of farmland and public 
ownership of infrastructure land, dispersed parcels of farms could be 
consolidated through exchange of private ownership and location into compact 
land units, which could then be enlarged by individual lease or 
cooperative/enterprise production; land could also be turned to public ownership 
to be contracted to expert farmers and cooperatives/enterprises - both would 
achieve economies of scale of land. In either process, intervention of 
governments, education of public opinion, active participation of farmers, and 
combination with overall rural development are necessary, and application of 





























































































1. Agarwal, S. K. 1971: "Economics of Land Consolidation in India", S. Chand, 
New Delhi.
2. Binns, Bernard O. Sep. 1950: "General", in Binns, Bernard O. (ed.) "The 
Consolidation of Fragmented Agricultural Holdings", Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Washington.
3. Blarel, Benoit; Hazell, Peter; Place, Frank and Quiggin, John. 1992: "The 
Economics of Farm Fragmentation: Evidence from Ghana and Rwanda", "The 
World Bank Economic Review", vol. 6, No. 2: 233-254.
4. Bonner, Jeffrey P. 1987: "Land Consolidation and Economic Development in 
India - A Study of Two Haryana Villages", the Riverdale Company, Inc., 
Maryland, USA.
5. Bray, Francesca. 1986: "The Rice Economies - Technology and Development 
in Asian Societies", Basil Blackwell.
6. Cheng, Shy-Hwa. 1994: "A Study of Full-Time Farm Families in Minimum 
Scale for Rice Crop Growing in Taiwan", "Journal of Agricultural Economics", 
vol. 56: 77-95. (In Chinese with English Summary)
7. Clout, Hugh. 1984: "A Rural Policy for the EEC?", Methuen, London and 
New York.
8. Elder, Joseph W. 1962: "Land Consolidation in an Indian Village: A Case 
Study of the Consolidation of Holdings Act in Uttar Pradesh", "Economic 
Development and Cultural Change", vol. 11, No. 1: 14-40.
9. ESJ. 1960-61: "Economic Survey of Japan (1960-1961)", Economic Planning 
Agency, Japanese Government, Published by The Japan Times, Ltd. Tokyo.
10. FAO. 1981: "1970 World Census of Agriculture - Analysis and International 
Comparison of the Results”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Rome.
11. FAO-PY. 1972: "FAO Production Yearbook 1972", Food and Agriculture 




























































































12. FAO-YP. 1993: "FAO Yearbook - Production 1993", Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
13. Francks, Penelope. Nov. 1995: "Agricultural Adjustment and the East Asian 
Development Model: the Japanese Example", seminar paper at School of 
Oriental and African Studies, London, to be published as "Leeds East Asia 
Paper" of University of Leeds.
14. Fre-Gov. Sep. 1950: The Government of the French Republic "Consolidation 
of Agricultural Holdings in France", in Binns, Bernard O. (ed.) "The 
Consolidation of Fragmented Agricultural Holdings", Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Washington.
15. Haack, Barry and English, Richard. 1996: "National Land Cover Mapping 
by Remote Sensing", "World Development", vol. 24, No. 5: 845-855
16. Harrison, Alan, (ed.) 1982: "Factors Influencing Ownership, Tenancy, 
Mobility and Use of Farmland in the Member States of the European 
Community", "Information on Agriculture", No. 86, Commission of the 
European Communities.
17. Hayami, Yujiro. 1988: "Japanese Agriculture under Siege", St. Martin’s 
Press, New York.
18. Hayami, Yujiro and Yamada, Saburo. 1991: "The Agricultural Development 
of Japan - A Century’s Perspective", University of Tokyo Press.
19. Heston, Alan and Kumar, Dharma. 1983: "The Persistence of Land 
Fragmentation in Peasant Agriculture: An Analysis of South Asian Cases", 
"Explorations in Economic History", vol. 20, No. 2: 199-220.
20. Huang, Chieh. 1967: "Farm Consolidation in Taiwan", Taiwan Provincial 
Government.
21. Hyodo, Setsuro. 1956: "Aspects of Land Consolidation in Japan", in Parsons, 
Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. (ed.) "Land Tenure", 
University of Wisconsin Press.
22. Ire-Gov. Sep. 1950: The Government of the Republic of Ireland "Relief of 
Rural Congestion in Ireland", in Binns, Bernard O. (ed.) "The Consolidation of 





























































































23. JMAFF (Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). 1988: 
"Results of Investigation on the Thinking of Farm Households". (In Japanese)
24. JMAFF. Nov. 1992: "The Basic Direction of New Policies for Food, 
Agriculture and Rural Areas", "Japan’s Agricultural Review", vol. 21.
25. JMAFF. 1994: "Rice Production Cost Survey 1994" (Rome Seisanhi Chosa). 
(In Japanese)
26. JMAFF. 1995: "Statistical Appendix to the 1995 Agricultural White Paper" 
(Heisei 6 Nendo Nogyo Hakusho Fuzoku Tokei Hyo). (In Japanese)
27. JMAFF (a). "Census of Agriculture and Forestry" (Noringyo Census), 
various issues. (In Japanese)
28. JMAFF (b). "Census of Agriculture and Forestry" (Noringyo Census), 
"Agricultural Survey" (Nogyo Chosa), "Statistical Appendix to the 1986 
Agricultural White Paper" (Showa 61 Nendo Nogyo Hakusho Fuzoku Tokei 
Hyo): 137. (In Japanese)
29. JMAFF (c). "Rice Production Cost Survey" (Rome Seisanhi Chosa), various 
issues. (In Japanese)
30. JMAFF (d). "Statistics of Cultivated Land and Areas Planted in Crops" 
(Rochi Oyobi Sakutsuke Menseki Tokei), various issues. (In Japanese)
31. JSY. 1992: "Japan Statistical Yearbook 1992", edited by Statistical Bureau - 
Management and Coordination Agency, published by Japan Statistical
Association.
32. JSY. 1996: "Japan Statistical Yearbook 1996", edited by Statistical Bureau - 
Management and Coordination Agency, published by Japan Statistical 
Association.
33. Rayo, N. (ed.) 1977: "The Basic Statistics of Japanese Agriculture" (Raitei 
Nihon Nogyo Riso Tokei), revised edition, Norin Tokei Ryokai, Tokyo. (In 
Japanese)




























































































Consolidation Policies in Greek Agriculture", "Geography", vol./Part 75, Issue 
326: 73-76.
35. Kojima, Reeitsu. Dec. 1988: "Agricultural Organization: New Forms, New 
Contradictions", "China Quarterly": 707-735.
36. Kristof, Nicholas D. Jan. 3, 1996: "Japanese Family Farm: A Way of Life 
in Crisis", "International Herald Tribune": 1. 4.
37. Kurita, Akiyoshi. 1994: "Conditions for Achieving Effective Land Use by 
Diversifying ‘Individual Farm Management Bodies’: Case Studies of Large- 
Scale Rice-and-Wheat Cropping Farms in Saitama Prefecture", "Journal of 
Science of Labor", vol. 70, No. 11: 511-529. (In Japanese with English 
Summary)
38. Monke, Eric; Avillez, Francisco and Ferro, Manuela. 1992: "Consolidation 
Policies and Small-Farm Agriculture in Northwest Portugal", "European Review 
of Agricultural Economics", No. 19: 67-83.
39. Myers, Ramon H. 1996: "Economy - China (Taiwan)", "The Far East and 
Australasia 1996", Europa Publications.
40. Nelson, Shayne. 1993: "Computer + Farmers = Better Cadastres", "Ceres" 
139, vol. 25, No. 1: 23-25, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Rome.
41. NIRA (National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan). 1995: "Study 
of How to Eradicate the Problem of Farmland That Is Small in Scale, 
Geographically Scattered, and Mixed Together in Terms of Its Ownership". (In 
Japanese with English Summary)
42. Nishimura, Kiyohiko G. and Sasaki, Shinya. 1993: "Agricultural Land 
Reform and the Japanese Farm Land Market", in Koppel, Bruce and Kim, D. 
Young (ed.) "Land Policy Problems in East Asia - Toward New Choices”, East 
West Center (Hawaii, USA) and Korea Research Institute for Human 
Settlements (South Korea).
43. Nurkse, Ragnar. 1953: "Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries", Basil Blackwell.




























































































"World Development", vol. 18, No. 2, 1990: 183-195.
45. Oshima, Harry T. 1987: "Economic Growth in Monsoon Asia", University 
of Tokyo Press.
46. Oshima, Harry T. 1993: "Strategic Processes in Monsoon Asia’s Economic 
Development", the Johns Hopkins University Press.
47. Riddell, Jim. Aug. 1996: Information from a Mission to Slovenia, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.
48. Roche, Jean. 1956: "Important Aspects of Consolidation in France", in 
Parsons, Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. (ed.) "Land 
Tenure", University of Wisconsin Press.
49. Rothacher, Albrecht. 1989: "Japan’s Agro-Food Sector", Macmilan.
50. Schaede, Ulrike; Asada, Koji and Tokunaga, Yoshiro. 1994: "Economy - 
Japan", "The Far East and Australasia 1994", Europa Publications.
51. Schaede, Ulrike; Asada, Koji and Tokunaga, Yoshiro. 1995: "Economy - 
Japan”, "The Far East and Australasia 1995", Europa Publications.
52. Schaede, Ulrike; Lowe, David and Tokunaga, Yoshiro. 1996: "Economy - 
Japan", "The Far East and Australasia 1996", Europa Publications.
53. Schiller, Otto. 1956: "Aspects of Land Consolidation in Germany", in 
Parsons, Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. (ed.) "Land 
Tenure", University of Wisconsin Press.
54. SDD-FAO. Nov. 22-24, 1995: Sustainable Development Department, Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations "Current Thinking and 
Activities", paper prepared for the Oversight Panel on Sustainable Development, 
Rome.
55. Sharma, K. L. 1986: "General Discussion (of paper by Simons)", 
"Agriculture in a Turbulent World Economy", Gower.
56. Skovgaard, K. Sep. 1950: "Consolidation of Agricultural Land in Denmark", 
in Binns, Bernard O. (ed.) "The Consolidation of Fragmented Agricultural 





























































































57. Swi-Gov. Sep. 1950: The Federal Government of Switzerland "Consolidation 
of Land in Switzerland", in Binns, Bernard O. (ed.) "The Consolidation of 
Fragmented Agricultural Holdings", Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Washington.
58. Tabata, Tamotsu. 1990: "Agricultural Problem Facing Japan: A Perspective 
from Agricultural Structure", National Research Institute of Agricultural 
Economics, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
59. Trivedi, K. D. and Trivedi, Kamla. 1973: "Consolidation of Holdings in 
Uttar Pradesh", "Journal of Administration Overseas", vol. 12, No. 2: 179-187.
60. Van Rossem, Jan M. 1956: "Aspects of Consolidation Work in the 
Netherlands", in Parsons, Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. 
(ed.) "Land Tenure", University of Wisconsin Press.
61. Vander Meer, Paul. 1982: "Farm Plot Dispersal, Luliao Village, Taiwan, 
1967", Chinese Materials Center.
62. Vanderpol, Philine R. 1956: "Reallocation of Land in the Netherlands", in 
Parsons, Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. (ed.) "Land 
Tenure", University of Wisconsin Press.
63. Ytterbom, G. R. 1956: "Consolidation of Holdings in Sweden", in Parsons, 
Kenneth H.; Penn, Raymond J. and Raup, Philip M. (ed.) "Land Tenure", 
University of Wisconsin Press.
64. Zaheer, M. Sep. 1975: "Measures of Land Reform: Consolidation of 
Holdings in India", "Behavioural Sciences and Community Development", vol. 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1997/98





































































































Working Papers of the Department of Economics 
Published since 1994
ECO No. 94/1 
Robert WALDMANN 
Cooperatives With Privately Optimal 
Price Indexed Debt Increase Membership 
When Demand Increases
ECO No. 94/2 
Tilman EHRBECK/Robert 
WALDMANN
Can Forecasters’ Motives Explain 








On the Interactions of Unit Roots and
Exogeneity
ECO No. 94/5
Bernadette GOVAERTS/David F. 
HENDRY/Jean-Francois RICHARD 
Encompassing in Stationary Linear 
Dynamic Models
ECO No. 94/6 
Luigi ERMINI/Dongkoo CHANG 
Testing the Joint Hypothesis of Rational­
ity and Neutrality under Seasonal Coin­




Unobserved Components in ARCH 
Models: An Application to Seasonal 
Adjustment *
ECO No. 94/8
Niels HALDRUP/Mark SALMON 
Polynomially Cointegrated Systems and 
their Representations: A Synthesis *
ECO No. 94/9
Mariusz TAMBORSKI
Currency Option Pricing with Stochastic
Interest Rates and Transaction Costs:
A Theoretical Model
ECO No. 94/10 
Mariusz TAMBORSKI 
Are Standard Deviations Implied in 
Currency Option Prices Good Predictors 
of Future Exchange Rate Volatility? *
ECO No. 94/11
John MICKLEWRJGHT/Gyula NAGY 
How Does the Hungarian Unemploy­
ment Insurance System Really Work? *
ECO No. 94/12 
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul 
MARRIOTT/Mark SALMON 
An Elementary Account of Amari’s 
Expected Geometry *
ECO No. 94/13
Domenico Junior MARCHETM 
Procyclical Productivity, Externalities 
and Labor Hoarding: A Reexamination of 
Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing *
ECO No. 94/14
Giovanni NERO
A Structural Model of Intra-European 
Airline Competition *
ECO No. 94/15 
Stephen MARTIN 








Seigniorage, Optimal Taxation, and Time 
Consistency: A Review *
ECO No. 94/18
Frederic PALOMINO
Noise Trading in Small Markets *
ECO No. 94/19
Alexander SCHRADER
Vertical Foreclosure, Tax Spinning and





























































































Andrzej BANIAK/Louis PHLIPS 
La Pléiade and Exchange Rate Pass- 
Through
ECO No. 94/21 
Marie SALMON
Bounded Rationality and Learning; 
Procedural Learning
ECO  No. 94/22 
Isabelle MARET 
Heterogeneity and Dynamics of 




Short-Run and Long-Run Cournot 
Equilibria in Multiproduct Industries
ECO No. 94/24
Alexander SCHRADER
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure:
Comment
ECO  No. 94/25 
Jeroen HINLOOPEN 
Subsidising Cooperative and Non- 
Cooperative R&D in Duopoly with 
Spillovers
ECO  No. 94/26
Debora DI GIOACCHINO 
The Evolution of Cooperation: 
Robustness to Mistakes and Mutation
ECO  No. 94/27
Kristina KOSTIAL
The Role of the Signal-Noise Ratio in
Cointegrated Systems
ECO  No. 94/28
Agustfn MARAVALL/Vlctor GÔMEZ 
Program SEATS “Signal Extraction in 
A RIMA Time Series” - Instructions for 
the User
ECO  No. 94/29 
Luigi ERMINI
A Discrete-Time Consumption-CAP 
Model under Durability of Goods, Habit 
Formation and Temporal Aggregation
ECO  No. 94/30
Debora DI GIOACCHINO 
Learning to Drink Beer by Mistake
ECO No. 94/31
Victor G6MEZ/Agustfn MARAVALL 
Program TRAMO ‘Time Series 
Regression with ARIMA Noise. Missing 
Observations, and Outliers” - 
Instructions for the User
ECO No. 94/32
Akos VALENTINYI
How Financial Development and
Inflation may Affect Growth
ECO No. 94/33 
Stephen MARTIN





Estimation Error and the Specification of 
Unobserved Component Models
ECO No. 94/35 
Robbin HERRING
The “Divergent Beliefs” Hypothesis and 





ECO No. 94/37 
Angel J. UBIDE




Credible Purchases of Credibility 
Through Exchange Rate Pegging:
An Optimal Taxation Framework
ECO No. 94/39 
Enrique ALBEROLAILA 
How Long Can a Honeymoon Last? 
Institutional and Fundamental Beliefs in 
the Collapse of a Target Zone
ECO No. 94/40
Robert WALDMANN 





























































































ECO No. 94/41 
John MICKLEWR1GHT/
Gyula NAGY




The Soda-ash Market in Europe:
Collusive and Competitive Equilibria 
With and Without Foreign Entry
ECO  No. 94/43
Hans-Theo NORMANN 
Stackelberg Warfare as an Equilibrium 
Choice in a Game with Reputation Effects
ECO  No. 94/44
Giorgio CALZOLARI/Gabriele 
FIORENTINI
Conditional Heteroskedasticity in 
Nonlinear Simultaneous Equations
ECO  No. 94/45
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul MARRIOTT/ 
Mark SALMON
On the Differential Geometry of the Wald 
Test with Nonlinear Restrictions
ECO  No. 94/46
Renzo G. AVESANI/Giampiero M. 
GALLQ/Mark SALMON 
On the Evolution of Credibility and 
Flexible Exchange Rate Target Zones *
ECO No. 95/1 
Paul PEZAN1S-CHRISTOU 
Experimental Results in Asymmetric 




Robust Estimation: An Example *
ECO No. 95/3
Giampiero M. GALLQ/Barbara PACINI 
Risk-related Asymmetries in Foreign 
Exchange Markets
ECO No. 95/4
Santanu ROY/Rien WAGENVOORT 




Third Package and Noncooperative 
Collusion in the European Airline 
Industry *
ECO No. 95/6
Renzo G. AVESANI/Giampiero M. 
GALLO/Mark SALMON 
On the Nature of Commitment in Flexible 
Target Zones and the Measurement of 
Credibility: The 1993 ERM Crisis *
ECO No. 95/7
John MICKLEWRIGHT/Gyula NAGY 
Unemployment Insurance and Incentives 
in Hungary *
ECO No. 95/8 
Kristina KOSTIAL
The Fully Modified OLS Estimator as a 
System Estimator A Monte-Carlo 
Analysis
ECO No. 95/9 
GOnther REHME
Redistribution, Wealth Tax Competition 
and Capital Flight in Growing 
Economies
ECO No. 95/10
Grayham E. MIZON 
Progressive Modelling of 
Macroeconomic Time Series: The LSE 
Methodology *
ECO No. 95/11
Pierre CAHUC/Hubert KEMPF 
Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions 
and Dynamic Strategic Interactions
ECO No. 95/12 
Tito BOERI
Is Job Turnover Countercyclical?
ECO No. 95/13
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Growth Effects from Trade and 
Technology *
ECO No. 95/14 
Miguel JIMfsNEZ/Domenico 
MARCHETTI, jr.
Thick-Market Externalities in U.S. 





























































































ECO  No. 95/15 
Berthold HERRENDORF 
Exchange Rate Pegging, Transparency, 
and Imports of Credibility
ECO  No. 95/16 
Gunther REHME
Redistribution, Income cum Investment 
Subsidy Tax Competition and Capital 
Flight in Growing Economies *
ECO  No. 95/17 
Tito BOERI/Stefano SCARPETTA 
Regional Dimensions of Unemployment 
in Central and Eastern Europe and Social 
Barriers to Restructuring
ECO  No. 95/18 
Bernhard WINKLER 
Reputation for EMU - An Economic 
Defence of the Maastricht Criteria *
ECO  No. 95/19
Ed HOPKINS
Learning, Matching and Aggregation
ECO  No. 95/20 
Doric VERNER
Can the Variables in an Extended Solow 
Model be Treated as Exogenous? 
Learning from International Comparisons 
Across Decades
ECO  No. 95/21 
Enrique ALBEROLA-ILA 
Optimal Exchange Rate Targets and 
Macroeconomic Stabilization
ECO  No. 95/22
Robert WALDMANN
Predicting the Signs of Forecast Errors *
ECO  No. 95/23 
Robert WALDMANN 
The Infant Mortality Rate is Higher 
where the Rich are Richer
ECO  No. 95/24
Michael J. ARTIS/Zenon G. 
KONTOLEMIS/Denise R. OSBORN 
Classical Business Cycles for G7 and 
European Countries
ECO  No. 95/25
Jeroen HINLOOPEN/Charles VAN
MARREWUK
On the Limits and Possibilities of the 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation *
ECO No. 95/26 
Jeroen HINLOOPEN 
Cooperative R&D Versus R&D- 
Subsidies: Cournot and Bertrand 
Duopolies
ECO No. 95/27
Giampiero M. GALLO/Hubert KEMPF 
Cointegration, Codependence and 
Economic Fluctuations
ECO No. 95/28 
Anna PETTINI/Stefano NARDELLI 




Rules of Thumb and Local Interaction *
ECO No. 95/30
Robert WALDMANN 
Democracy, Demography and Growth
ECO No. 95/31
Alessandra PELLONI





Indeterminacy and Welfare Increasing 
Taxes in a Growth Model with Elastic 
Labour Supply
ECO No. 95/33
Jeroen HINLOOPEN/Stephen MARTIN 
Comment on Estimation and 
Interpretation of Empirical Studies in 
Industrial Economics
ECO No. 95/34 
M.J. ARTIS/W. ZHANG 
International Business Cycles and the 
ERM: Is there a European Business
Cycle?
ECO No. 95/35 
Louis PHLIPS
On the Detection of Collusion and 
Predation
ECO No. 95/36 
Paolo GUARDA/Mark SALMON 





























































































ECO No. 95/37 
Chiara MONFARDINI 
Simulation-Based Encompassing for 
Non-Nested Models: A Monte Carlo 
Study of Alternative Simulated Cox Test 
Statistics
ECO  No. 95/38 
Tito BOERI
On the Job Search and Unemployment 
Duration
ECO  No. 95/39
Massimiliano MARCELLINO 




Some Consequences of Temporal 
Aggregation of a VARIMA Process
ECO  No. 95/41
Giovanni NERO
Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing
ECO  No. 95/42
Giovanni NERO
Spatial Multiproduct Pricing: Empirical 
Evidence on Intra-European Duopoly 
Airline Markets
ECO No. 95/43 
Robert WALDMANN 
Rational Stubbornness?
ECO  No. 95/44 
Tilman EHRBECK/Robert 
WALDMANN
Is Honesty Always the Best Policy? 
ECO No. 95/45
Giampiero M. GALLO/Barbara PACINI 
Time-varying/Sign-switching Risk 
Perception on Foreign Exchange Markets
ECO  No. 95/46
Victor GÓMEZ/Agustfn MARAVALL 
Programs TRAMO and SEATS 
Update: December 1995
ECO No. 96/1 
Ana Rule CARDOSO 




Workers or Employers: Who is Shaping
Wage Inequality?
ECO No. 96/3
David F. HENDRY/Grayham E. MIZON 
The Influence of A.W.H. Phillips on 
Econometrics
ECO No. 96/4 
Andrzej BANIAK
The Multimarket Labour-Managed Firm 




The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning:
A Global Stability Result
ECO No. 96/6
James DOW
Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial 
Innovation
ECO No. 96/7 
Marion KOHLER
Coalitions in International Monetary 
Policy Games
ECO No. 96/8
John MICKLEWRIGHT/ Gyula NAGY 
A Follow-Up Survey of Unemployment 




Transfers and Exchange Between 
Households in Central Asia
ECO No. 96/10
Christian BELZIL/Xuelin ZHANG 
Young Children and the Search Costs of 
Unemployed Females
ECO No. 96/11 
Christian BELZIL
Contiguous Duration Dependence and 





























































































ECO  No. 96/12
Ramon MARIMON
Learning from Learning in Economics
ECO  No. 96/13
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Diffusion, Learning and 
Economic Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation on an Extended Set of 
Countries
ECO  No. 96/14
Humberto L6PEZ/Eva ORTEGA/Angel 
UBIDE
Explaining the Dynamics of Spanish 
Unemployment
ECO  No. 96/15 
Spyros VASSILAKIS 
Accelerating New Product Development 
by Overcoming Complexity Constraints
ECO  No. 96/16
Andrew LEWIS 
On Technological Differences in 
Oligopolistic Industries
ECO No. 96/17 
Christian BELZIL
Employment Reallocation, Wages and 
the Allocation of Workers Between 
Expanding and Declining Firms
ECO No. 96/18
Christian BELZHVXuelin ZHANG 
Unemployment, Search and the Gender 
Wage Gap: A Structural Model
ECO No. 96/19
Christian BELZIL
The Dynamics of Female Time Allocation 
upon a First Birth
ECO No. 96/20
Hans-Theo NORMANN 
Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model 
with Incomplete Information
ECO No. 96/21
Ramon MARIMON/Fabrizio ZILIBOTTI 
‘Actual’ Versus ‘Virtual’ Employment in 
Europe: Is Spain Different?
ECO No. 96/22 
Chiara MONFARDINI 
Estimating Stochastic Volatility Models 
Through Indirect Inference
ECO No. 96/23 
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Diffusion, Learning and 
Growth: An Empirical Investigation of a 
Set of Developing Countries
ECO No. 96/24 
Luisa ZANFORLIN 
Technological Assimilation, Trade 
Patterns and Growth: An Empirical 





In Plato’s Cave: Sharpening the Shadows 
of Monetary Announcements
ECO No. 96/26 
Dimitrios SIDERIS 
The Wage-Price Spiral in Greece: An 
Application of the LSE Methodology in 
Systems of Nonstationary Variables
ECO No. 96/27
Andrei SAVKOV
The Optimal Sequence of Privatization in 
Transitional Economies
ECO No. 96/28
Jacob LUNDQUIST/Dorte VERNER 
Optimal Allocation of Foreign Debt 
Solved by a Multivariate GARCH Model 
Applied to Danish Data
ECO No. 96/29
Dorte VERNER
The Brazilian Growth Experience in the 
Light of Old and New Growth Theories
ECO No. 96/30
Steffen HORNIG/Andrea LOFARO/ 
Louis PHLIPS
How Much to Collude Without Being 
Detected
ECO No. 96/31 
Angel J. UBIDE
The International Transmission of Shocks 
in an Imperfectly Competitive 
International Business Cycle Model
ECO No. 96/32
Humberto LOPEZ/Angel J. UBIDE






























































































On the Efficiency of Bertrand and









On the Non-Stationarity of German 
Income Mobility (and Some Observations 
on Poverty Dynamics)
ECO  No. 96/36 
Jian-Ming ZHOU
Proposals for Land Consolidation and 
Expansion in Japan
'out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
%
3A
IK
-
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
